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EU ENLARGEMENT FROM FIFTEEN TO TWENTY-FIVE: 
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS1
The accession of ten candidate countries to the EU in May 2004 
marks an important turning point in its history. To ensure a smooth course 
of this process a clear insight into the problems involved and issues at 
stake is needed. These can be classifi ed into two main groups. The fi rst 
is the problem of “deepening” the process of integration in the Union, 
which in the fi rst place means a viable process of decisionmaking and 
an expedient implementation of respective policies. The second is rela-
ted with the challenges that the economic and monetary union is facing 
because of the new constellation of interests created by the accession of 
the newcomer countries. Conclusions follow.
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Introduction
On April 16, 2003, representatives of ten countries signed treaties of accession 
to the European Union at a grand ceremony staged on the Akropolis in Athens. The 
new candidates – Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithua-
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nia, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia – will, on the force of this, become full 
Union members by May 1, 2004. Until then, they will have observer status in the 
EU, with the right to participate in  the committees of the European Parliament as 
well as the right to send observers to the Parliament’s plenary sessions.
This act marks a successful end of the tedious negotiations between the fi fte-
en EU co-untries and the ten candidates held in December 2002 in Kopenhagen. 
It was greeted with a genuine euphoria in the candidate countries. Referendums 
on accession, where they were held, were overwhelmingly in favour – notably in 
the ex-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. For these countries, 
EU membership was, together with an accession to NATO, their most important 
foreign policy goal . To the incumbent members, it was felt to be the fulfi lment of 
a moral obligation towards these countries, as well as a big step towards a “Greater 
Europe”. However, a number of factors related to the accession of these “new ten” 
may create a number of novel problems for the course of effective integration of the 
newcomers, which may decisively infl uence the prospects of  the future achievement 
of  “an ever closer union”. Therefore a closer look at this new context is needed.
The New Context
Unlike many similar events before, this one certainly deserves to be considered 
as hi-storical. It may also be a major turning point in the whole process of European 
integration. True, every preceding enlargement was in a sense a shock and a need 
for retrenchment. With the accession of Britain, Denmark and Ireland in 1973 the 
population of the Community has increased by 32% and its GDP by 29%; with the 
accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995 its territory has expanded by 43% 
and its GDP by 9%  Interestingly enough, each enlargement brought about a drop 
in the average wealth of the community: Taking the average GDP per head of the 
original Six (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) 
as 100, then the average GDP of the whole Community amounted in 1973 to 97; 
in 1986 it fell to 91 and in 1995 at only 89 (Rachman 2001, 2). The result of every 
enlargement was, therefore, a continuous increase in income discrepancies, which 
as a consequence called for important responses in terms of policy  – such as e.g..the 
establishment of “solidarity funds” for regional development as well as a number 
of specifi c policies aimed at the protection of the ever more varied interests of the 
member countries.
The fi rst important aspect of the new context is related to the very number of 
the new entrants. The accession of ten new entrants as an addition to the already 
existing fi fteen members creates a disproportional increase of the already existing 
strain on the Union’ s institutions. The original institutions of the Union have har-
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dly changed since their establishment un-der the Treaty of Rome, and were quite 
adequate for an association of six not very different countries. In the meantime 
not only the number of member countries has vastly increased, but also the num-
ber and scope of acivities of the communitarian institutions has also grown. The 
consequence of this is a serious operational problem – how to reshape the Union’s 
institutions in order to ensure an effi cient process of decisionmaking while in the 
same time assuring the democratic character of the whole process.
In this context an important structural aspect has to be observed. Most of 
the new entrants - in fact, all of them except Poland – are considered as small 
countries. Thus the previous balance among the fi ve big and ten smaller countries 
and the corresponding distribution of political weight is fundamentally disrupted, 
since after the accession of the new entrants there will be six big countries pitted 
against nineteen small ones. This new situation, which The Economist poignantly 
described as “the tyranny of small nations” is resented by all bigger countries keen 
to preserve their infl uence.
The second important novelty is a further and steeply growing tendency to-
wards economic inequality and shifts in relative economic positions. Taking again 
the GDP of the Union’s original Six as 100, the average GDP of the Union will, 
after the accession of the new entrants, fall from the present 89 to only 75. For 
some of the poorer incumbent member states this also means that some of them 
may fi nd themselves above the threshold which entitles them to various forms of 
communitarian aid, just because the new entrants are much poorer than Greece, 
Portugal and Spain were at the time of their accession. Consequently, there is no 
doubt that these countries will do whatever they can in order to minimise the loss 
of these benefi ts  originating from this new situation.
Next, the fact that eight of the ten new entrants are ex-communist countries. 
All of them only recently (and with various degrees of effi iciency) emerged from 
a long and painful transition process. The consequence of this may be that the aut-
horities in these countries lack experience in the implementation of the “capitalist” 
rules of conduct (the acquis communéautaire included) and that also the general 
standards of honesty and probity of their public administration as well as the ob-
servance of the rule of law by their judiciary may be questionable. This may be a 
dangerous source of suspicion and controversy in the relationship between the old 
and new members, especially as to what the implementation of the communitarian 
rules is concerned.
Finally, the fact that the eight ex-communist new entrants were for full four 
decades bossed around by Russia in the framework of the “community of socialist 
nations” may have an important political connotation. Since, as we all know, their 
experiences behind the Iron Curtain were not really enjoyable, their views on foreign 
policy will be more infl uenced by a fear of Russian threats (and therefore a longing 
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for security under an American umbrella) than by sharing the Franch and German 
disdain for the new imperial arrogance demonstrated by America’s President Bush 
in the case of the Anglo – American campaign on Iraq. At a time when the creation 
of a new common foreign and security policy is at stake, this may be an important 
source of  confl ict and discord.
All this can rightly be considered as a source of a number of serious problems, 
which may render the prospects for this new “Greater Europe” rather uncertain. 
Further on, we will analyse these problems under two headings: the fi rst will be 
those related to the reshaping of the communitarian institutions in order to render 
them more effective; the second will deal with some key elements of the economic 
and monetary union.
The Quest for More Effi cient Institutions: the Treaties 
of Amsterdam and Nice and the Constitutional Battle
Until the beginning of this century, the problem with new entrants was seen 
as mainly one of adaptation to the communitarian standards. Consequently, it was 
resolved by  preparatory activities, which often stretched over lenghty periods: 
while the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden in January 1995 was preceded 
by a preparatory period of only two years, Greece signed an association agreement 
in 1961 but was able to apply for full membership only in 1975; Spain signed an 
association agreement in 1970, but applied only ih 1977. (Jones 2001, 462). The 
problem of stream-lining the communitarian process of decisionmaking started to 
emerge after the collapse of communism, when a fl ood of application for member-
ship came in from the newly democratised countries of Central and Eastern Europe: 
Hungary applied in 1994, and nine others – Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Czechia and Slovenia – subsequently applied.
The Pressures and Responses
This avalanche of applications became a matter of serious concern, since under 
Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union any European state which respects 
the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms as well as the rule of law may apply for Union membership. Besides, 
the EU’s assumption of special relationship with the Central and Eastern European 
countries was justifi ed in terms of enlightened self-interest: since these countries 
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are located in its immediate neighbourhood, the EU would fi nd it diffi -cult to 
shield itself from the consequences of economic collapse and resulting political 
insta-bility in the region.
Nevertheless, the public opinion in the EU countries is less than enthusiastic 
about this round of enlargement. A Eurobarometer opinion survey undertaken in 
autumn 2000 showed that 44% of EU citizens supported, and 35% opposed future 
enlargement (ibid., 468). This attitude refl ected the concerns about the accession 
of the ex-communist countries to the Union.  These can be grouped into two broad 
categories: one, refl ecting the fact that these countries are poor, to an extent disor-
ganised and ineffi cient - they will be  net benefi ciaries from the EU budget; there 
will be greater diffi culty to defi ne and apply environmental and other standards 
concerning quality of life; there will be a surge of crime and illegal immigration); 
the other is based on the fears of impaired effi ciency of the EU institutions - there 
will be more interests to reconcile in the sein of the EU; the EU institutions more 
diffi cult to manage. On the basis of these concerns the debate on “deepening versus 
widening” has come to the fore.
The arguments of this debate have been summarized by R.A. Jones as fol-
lows:
The Case for Deepening:
• The momentum of integration must be maintained, otherwise the whole 
process will stall;
• It is better to create strong foundations for the EU before other countries 
are allowed to it;
• Premature entry of Central and Eastern European countries would impose 
a burden on the EU budget;
• Precipitated widening could make the EU more inward-looking and  pre-
occupied with problems arising from its heterogeneous membership;
• Extensive widening could exacerbate confl icts within the EU, by increasing 
the number and range  of problems.
The Case for Widening:
• It is inevitable that many other European states will join the EU. It therefore 
seems reasonable to delay further deepening, so that new members can play 
a full role in EU’s development;
• Not to widen would be to betray the principles on which the EU was foun-
ded, i.e. on openness to any democratic European state;
• The EU would no longer be confi ned to Western Europe and would become 
a truly European formation;
• Not to widen would be to miss  the historic opportunity created by the end 
of the cold war to end the division of Europe once and for all. (ibid., 469)
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Against the background of subsequent events it is evident that a policy of 
both “deepe- ning” and “widening” was pursued – but that a large discrepancy in 
favour of the latter has occurred. The stream-lining of the Union’s institutions is, 
therefore, becoming an overriding pri-ority for the future of the Union.  In that 
context two events deserve special consideration – the Treaties of Amsterdam and 
Nice and the present constitutional battle.
The Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice
The Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 extended and streamlined the so-called co-
decision procedure in the European Parliament as the main legislative procedure 
and extended the regi-me of qualifi ed majority voting in the Council of Ministers. 
The co-decision procedure was extended to fourteen existing treaty areas and to 
eight new responsibilities, so that this proce-dure covers about 80% of Council 
decisions. Next, the Treaty gives the European Parliament the right to impose 
sanctions on member states who are liable of a serious and persistent breach of 
fundamental rights. Moreover, it clearly defi nes subsidiarity and proportionality 
as the most important principles of European integration, defi ning subsidiarity as 
an empowerment for communitarian action only in the case when the objectives 
of the proposed action “cannot be suffi ciently achieved by the member States and 
can therefore…be better achieved by the Community”. The Treaty links to this the 
principle of proportionality,  which has “…to ensure that the impact of Union law 
on national law does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives 
of the treaty.” (Jones 2001, 61-2, 74-5). Although these provisions are no small 
achievement, it has, in fact, fudged the issue of institutional reform.
A major step in the preparation for the envisaged EU enlargements (known 
as the “Europe of 27”)  had to be the Nice summit held under the French presi-
dency in December 2000. Its centerpiece was the issue of national voting weights 
in the Council of Ministers and the representation of  each member country at the 
Commission and the European Parliament. Its results were put down in the Treaty 
of Nice. Its main features were: the extension of qualifi ed majority voting to in-
dustrial policy, economic relations with non-EU countries, judicial cooperation in 
judicial matters, measures to facilitate freedom of movement of EU citizens and on 
a number of statutory and organisational matters; the introduction of a double (and 
even-tually triple) system of majority voting. The regular voting system is based 
on a double majority – i.e. a majority of weighted votes, combined with a majority 
of the member states. The “third majority” which sometimes may be used is one 
that requires the votes of countries comprising at least 62% of the total population 
of the Union. This “population threshold” could be invoked by any member of the 
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Council as a verifi cation of the vote. The most contentious issue was, however, the 
distribution of votes in the Commission because of strange arrangements without 
clear criteria. Thus Britain, France and Germany were all allocated 29 votes altho-
ugh Germany has a much larger population than the two other countries. Spain was 
awarded with 27 votes as well as Poland (after accession) . But Belgium has lost its 
voting parity with the Netherlands, while Romania will be awarded only one more 
vote than the Netherlands although it has 7 million inhabitants more.
An equally contentious issue became the composition of the Commission. 
Here the bigger states advocated the idea of a limited number of commissioners, 
while the smaller countries were determined to ensure that they did not lose their 
right to choose their own man. The solution offered then was a compromise in so 
far, that the big countries have given up their right to a second commissioner from 
the beginning of 2005; in return they demanded a “deferred ceiling” whereby there 
will be one commissioner per country up to 2010; but when the EU grows to 27 
states the number of commissioners will have to be less than the number of member 
states (Jones 2001, 89-94).
For all this, the Treaty of Nice will be remembered for several things: fi rst, 
for the fuzziness and arbitrariness of the rules adopted, which created widespread 
discontent across the Union; second, for the fi rst confrontation of big versus small 
member countries – and third, for the struggle of member countries for their relative 
statutory positions, which will dominate the ensuing constitutional battle.
The Constitutional Battle: Interim Results
The Convention on the European constitution met for the fi rst time on Feb. 
28, 2002. It comprises 105 delegates and an equal number of assorted grandees as 
alternates. Its tasks were defi ned by the Laeken Declaration according to which the 
Convention was established - as strenghtening democracy, increased transparency 
and greater effi ciency of the Union’s institutions (Smerdel 2003, 511). In practice 
it became, what The Economist aptly called, “an intergovernmental tug-of-war”. 
As soon as its president, Valéry Giscard d’ Estaing and his praesidium issued the 
fi rst sixteen articles of a draft constitution in February 2003, they received over 
1,000 proposed amendments from all sides. (The Economist, March 8th, 2003, 37)2 
The most important points of contention were: the idea to increase the powers of 
the Ecofi n council of fi nance ministers of the euro zone over economic policy; the 
2 For obvious reasons it would be impossible to review the whole debate on the subject. In 
this paper only the most important subjects are covered, as discussed in The Economist and The 
Financial Times.
U. DUJŠIN: EU Enlargement From Fifteen To Twenty-five: Problems and Prospects
EKONOMSKI PREGLED, 55 (3-4) 227-255 (2004)234
appointment of a European fi nance minister and increased use of qualifi ed majority 
voting for indirect taxation; the call for “approximation” of indirect and company 
taxation in the member countries, as well as “a renewed emphasis on 1970s-style 
corporate bargaining between employers’ groups and organised labour…and undo 
years of painful (Thatcherite) reforms in one fell swoop”. “A poor constitution for 
Europe” commented The Financial Times (Feb. 9/10th, 2003, 23) The idea of dele-
gating the “exclusive competence” over the internal market’s “four freedoms” was 
also strongly opposed by the British and Germans, while the French and Germans 
jointly opposed the idea that the EU should co-ordinate all EU’ countries’ economic 
policies (Charlemagne – a) 2003, 31).
On April 22, 2003 the Cenvention’s ideas for the reform of the enlarged in-
stitutions were presented. These envisaged a powerful president for the Council of 
Ministers, where all member countries’ national governments are represented, with 
a mandate of two-and-a-half years. He is supposed to preside over a mini-cabinet, 
charged with guiding the EU’s work. As to the other main executive body, the 
Commission, the proposal suggested that the number of its members be reduced 
from the present twenty to fi fteen and that its president may appoint another fi fteen 
non-voting “advisory” commissioners. The number of members of the European 
Parliament from each country should be made more directly proportional to its 
population. A new institution, the European Congress, should be established where 
two-thirds of its members would come from national parliaments and which would 
decide any further constitutional changes and debate the policy proposals of the 
new president of the council.
The issues raised by these proposals have immediately been perceived as 
attempts to shift the present balance of power between these two most important 
bodies of the Union. So they have almost immediately come under fi re from various 
sides. Thus the Commission, which operates in the same way as governments do 
and is traditionally the most powerful institution in the Union, issued a statement 
almost immediately after the publication of these proposals denouncing them as 
liable to create “confusion and duplication of bureaucracies” and an “unequal 
treatment of member states”. Representatives of smaller member countries were 
also fearing to lose their present infl uence in the Commission through the loss of 
their commissioer, and found the proposal “insulting”. They also strongly opposed 
the changes in the structure of the European Parliament. In sum, these proposals 
were characterised as an attempt to reduce the power of smaller EU countries, the 
Commission and the European Parliament. They were also seen to try to strenght-
hen the hand of the defenders of the nation state against the advocates of more 
powerful pan-European governance. “Institutional mayhem” – commented The 
Economist (April 26th, 21).
The proposal restates the already mentioned transfer of power to EU instituti-
ons in twenty new areas, where it also proposed to abolish national vetoes. On the 
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other hand there was a retreat in relation to former ideas insofar, that the national 
veto over taxation was retained on which Britain and Ireland were insisting. It also 
strenghthened the hand of national parliaments insofar, that if a third of national 
parliaments expressed the opinion that a proposed EU law exceeds the Union’s 
empowerments they can force the Commission to reconsider it – and ultimately 
ask the European Court of Justice to adjudicate.
One contentious issue was, however, reopened - the distribution of voting 
rights, although the decision on them has already been reached by the Treaty of 
Nice albeit in an unsatisfactory way. Because of this, the representatives of smal-
ler nations became seriously worried about a possible loss of status. On the other 
hand, the proponents of change do seem to have a case: if the present distribution 
of voting power were maintained, then in an enlarged community of twenty-fi ve 
the smallest countries, representing only 1,5% of the EU’s GDP would have more 
voting power than the six largest countries with 82% of the Union’s GDP. Proponents 
of change also point out that at present it takes ten times as many votes to elect a 
German member of the European Parliament than to elect one from Luxembourg. 
(The Economist, May 31st, 2003, 27-28)
If both smaller and bigger countries have reasons for discontent, so do the 
regions – formerly promoted as a welcome sub-national instance of political de-
cisionmaking. It seems, however, that at present the EU is no longer encouraging 
regionalism. “Efforts by Catalonia, Scotland, Flanders and the German Länder to 
have a bigger role for regions written into the draft of the new EU constitution were 
rebuffed by the convention on the future of Europe, partly thanks to pressure from 
Spain and France.”The Committee of Regions, based in Brussels and headed by 
the suitably named Sir Albert Bore from Birmingham, England, is a by-word for 
tedium and toothlessness” commented The Economist. Now some proponents of 
regionalism, such as the German Länder and Italy’s Northern League, complain 
that EU competition rules are threatening their traditional practice of providing aid 
to local industries. Although eurocrats may on the theoretical level be attracted by 
the idea of a further layering of levels of political power, the Commission did not 
want to antagonise powerful member governments. Moreover, EU offi cials are 
aware of the fact that it will be dauntingly diffi cult to secure agreement between 
twenty-fi ve member states, and they reckon that it “will be totally impossible … 
with more powerful regional governments as well” (Charlemagne – b, 2003, 32) 
The enlargement of the EU may undoubtedly contribute to the “rebelliousness” of 
the European regions. Many of the new member countries, such as Malta or the 
three Baltic states, are both smaller and poorer than such regions as Catalonia or 
Flanders. The battle for regionalism is, evidently, far from over.
These issues raise a question all too familiar to people in former Yugoslavia: 
which principle is more democratic – “one man – one vote”, or “one nation – one 
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vote”…The problem is that there is no consensus on what the Union really wants to 
be – not even in the same country. Robert Schumann, one of the “founding fathers” 
of the European Communities, was envisaging an “Europe des citoyens” – which 
would imply the creation of a supranational state. On the contrary, Charles de Gaulle 
spoke of an “Europe des patries” – which, in turn, might mean only a community of 
states. Finally, Jacques Delors, the formidable godfather of the Maastricht Treaty, 
was speaking of an “Europe des régions”  - which evidently implies a  curtailment 
of the authority of the component nation-states in favour of sub-national entities. 
At present it seems that the adherents to a Europe of nation-states have the upper 
hand; but nothing is granted for the future. So the direction towards the process of 
forging an “ever closer union”, is erratic and highly uncertain.
Another issue which seemed to be already resolved, has recently been raised 
again – the  reduction of the threshold for a decision under qualifi ed majority voting.. 
At present, a qualifi ed majority decision requires 72,3% of votes, while under the 
new rules this should be reduced to 60%. At fi rst sight, this evidently  enhances 
the effi ciency of decisionmaking. But Roland Vaubel, adviser to Germany’s fede-
ral economic ministry,  warned that this could lead to a disadvantage for the less 
regulated states.”When regulations can be introduced by a majority of the member 
states, the more highly regulated states have an incentive to impose regulation on 
the less regulated states. This is the so-called ‘strategy of rising rival’s costs’.
The history of federal states provides many examples for this - explains 
Vaubel. In the US  the federal minimum wage was introduced by a congressional 
majority from the northern states, where most wages were above the minimum 
anyway, against the fi erce resistance from the southern states which feared for their 
competitiveness. The strategy of raising rivals’ costs has often been pursued in the 
EU. Thus the working time directions from 1993, which Britain unsuccessfully 
challenged at the European Court of Justice, were forcibly imposed by majority 
vote. Another case in point is the droit de suite directive from 2001, which forces 
art dealers to transfer a certain percentage of their proceeds to the artists or their 
heirs. This regulation has been in force in a majority of member states, among 
them France and Germany. A minority of countries, among them Britain, has been 
outvoted.
Unfortunately, the tightening of regulation in the more liberal member states 
is not all. As the competitive pressures from these countries mount, their regulati-
on-prone majority of member states can afford to expand their domestic regulation 
even further. They will then impose these regulations on the minority – and a vicious 
circle develops which can only im-pair Europe’s competitiveness.(The Financial 
Times, November 14th, 2003)
Although the mandate of the Convention has expired on July 15th 2003,  the 
constitutional battle is far from over. Further debate was scheduled for the next 
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intergovernmental conference: among the pending issues are requests from Spain 
and Poland for an increase of voting rights – an issue on which, as already menti-
oned, decision has already been taken.
The intergovernmental conference held at the end of November 2003 in Naples, 
enacted further changes in the proposals of institutional change were made: now 
all twenty-fi ve members of the Commission will have a vote, although the fi nal 
decision has to be made at the December summit to be held at Brussels. Moreover, 
the former French idea of an operational directoire in the form of a closer cabinet 
empowered to decide on “urgent matters” in the sein of the Commission has been 
reinvented (Vjesnik, 30 studenog 2003).
The most tangible result of the present  constitutional battle are new front-lines 
among the member countries relative to the issues described above – and more. 
The proposed shift of balance of power in the Council of Ministers through the 
new voting system is opposed by Spain and Poland because they would suffer a 
considerable loss of infl uence. On the other hand, Germany, which would gain from 
that system continues to insist that its adoption is crucial for the new constitution. 
The smaller countries insist that they will not agree to losing the voting rights of 
their commissioner. The Irish are opposed to the idea that their system of criminal 
law may move towards the European continental model. Britain, Portugal, Slova-
kia and Austria are against the harmonisation of criminal law procedures. Britain, 
Ireland, Poland and Sweden oppose even the idea to call the person in charge of EU 
foreign affairs “foreign minister” because this implies the creation of a superstate. 
Provisions to allow a core group of countries to create a closer defence union are 
opposed by Britain, Finland and the central European countries. Britain and Ireland 
are leading a battle against “any hint of tax harmonisation”. A number of fi nance 
ministers also wants to limit the European Parliament’s planned powers over the 
budget.(Charlemagne – c 2003, 35). However, not everything is controversial: 
a big extension of majority voting, a binding Charter of Fundamental Rights, a 
President of the Council of ministers, a legal personality for the Union and the 
fi rst explicit statement of the supremancy of EU law over national statutes. These 
are no small matters, but how much have they contributed to the effi ciency of the 
Union’s decisionmaking?
At the European constitutional conference in Rome on October 4th, 2003 most 
of the heads of government assembled there were asked why was it necessary to 
adopt a European constitution at all. Most of them answered that a constitution was 
needed “in order to make enlargement work better (Charlemagne – d 2003, 35) . 
Looking more closely at the “big new ideas” in the draft, The Economist found that 
they “have very little to do with enlargement. There is no stringent requirement to 
create a European foreign minister or to adopt a Charter of Fundamental Rights 
or to expand the Union’s authority in the fi eld of criminal law just because of an 
U. DUJŠIN: EU Enlargement From Fifteen To Twenty-five: Problems and Prospects
EKONOMSKI PREGLED, 55 (3-4) 227-255 (2004)238
increase in the number of the members of the Union. “…All the legal and insti-
tutional arrangements needed to cope with an enlargement were, in fact, settled 
by the Treaty of Nice, which was agreed less than three years ago EU heads of 
government then declared proudly that Nice ‘ opens the way to enlargement’ and 
‘completes the institutional changes necessary for the accession of new member 
states’” (ibid., 35) Not necessarily. However, if adopted, the French idea of a dire-
ctoire in the Council of Ministers entrusted with day-to-day matters could improve 
its expediency, on the condition that a) it maintains a well-balanced structure in 
terms of big vs. small nations, b) that it develops good working relations with the 
rest of the Council and c) that an effective mechanism of co-ordination with the 
Commission is established.
Recently the events took a worrying turn in this respect. On February 18, 
2004 a summit between the German Chancellor G.Schröder, France’s President J. 
Chirac and  Britain’s Prime Minister T.Blair was arranged in Berlin. Its announ-
ced purpose was to create a common political initiative on problems of the labour 
market, security and innovation – to be presented to the Council of Ministers in 
March.(Večernji list, Feb. 16, 2004, 24). This attempt to create a “triumvirate” 
in order to steer the Council has, however, not been greeted with sympathy – not 
only by small, but also by some big countries; Italy’s Prime Minister S. Berlusconi 
protested loudly. Recalling the dismal fate of all triumvirates from Roman to Soviet 
times, one could only agree with the dissenters.
One could reasonably argue that this constitutional battle may be a good 
opportunity to redress the causes of discontent created by previous decisions. But 
we could also agree with The Economist that the whole story about this constitu-
tional battle described above had little to do with making the enlargement work 
better. The Economist guesses that the whole exercise has been engineered by 
European federalists who feared that enlargement may “destroy their dream of an 
EU that evolves into a political union, with a genuine economic government and 
a unifi ed foreign policy, particularly since many central Europeans are suspected 
of harbouring an outmoded attachment to national sovereignty” (ibid., 35). The 
ensuing battle proved, however, that many incumbent member states share these 
“outmoded” sentiments.
Had this whole exercise really been about making enlargement work better, 
then an important point,  the control of implementation of EU law would not be 
omitted. True, acceptance to membership supposes a full adoption of the acquis 
communéautaire, as well as adequate standards of compliance to the rule of law 
as well as to standards of public administration and honesty in public life. To this 
end, ample aid in the implementation of reforms of administrative and judicial 
structures in the candidate countries is also provided (European 2002, passim). 
Nevertheless, it is well known that these standards are not uniformly applied even 
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throughout the Union, creating tensions between the sterner “northern” and the 
laxer “southern” member countries, especially when suspicions about corruption 
are at stake. While in Sweden a young government offi cial doomed her further 
career because of  70 euros of private expenses charged on her government credit 
card, protagonists of monumental misdeeds in France (J. Chirac), Italy (S. Berlu-
scoini) and even Germany (Helmut Kohl) extricated themselves out of these affairs 
unscathed. “In years gone by, revelations of corruption could be treated by people 
in other countries as good, dirty fun” warned The Economist. “But in these days 
of deepening European political integration, different ideas about what constitutes 
corruption pose a real problem”.  Therefore, “a sense of mistrust between EU coun-
tries is not an abstract or occasional problem. It affects their day-to-day dealings... 
In the wake of September 11 the Union approved plans for a pan-European arrest 
warrant which will short-circuit traditional and lenghty extradition procedures  But 
such a measure requires complete faith in the judiciaries of all 25 countries that 
will join the Union…including several ones that have only recently emerged from 
the former Soviet block” (Charlemagne – e 2003, 35; see also similar comments 
quoted in Smerdel 2003, 520). Since the existing mechanism for appraisals of the 
quality of the public administration and judiciary such as “twinning” still have to 
prove their worth, the quest for a more effective one should at least be proposed. If 
not, the existing “trust gap” between member countries on that matter may persist, 
even widen and create further confl icts.
Challenges to the economic and monetary union
Up to the present we have argued that the problems of institutional reform 
pitted adherents to nation-states against federalists and big against small countri-
es, it seems that problems of economic policy concerning the functioning of the 
economic and monetary union may well pit new against old member countries. 
The underlying problem is, as already mentioned, obvious: since the new entrants 
are all much poorer than the EU average, the overriding problem for them is to 
accelerate their growth, in order to catch up the average level of the Union’s pro-
sperity. For this they need generous handouts of aid and transfers, making them, as 
already mentioned, dangerous competitors to the present benefi ciaries of EU funds 
The problem is all the more important, since the income gap between  incumbents 
and newcomers is considerable and the very act of accession will for all of them 
represent a more or less severe initial shock and setback3
3 All reviews of the accession process of the “new ten” stress this fact. Cf. European (2oo2), 
for all evaluated countries.
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The Crucial Point: How to Close the Income-Gap
The acceptance into membership of any new candidate country supposes, 
among other things, the fulfi lment of the second Copenhagen criterion, which sta-
tes that a candidate must have an effi cient market economy and an ability to face 
competitive pressures in the Union. The problem consists, however, in the fact that 
the EU is a rich men’s club, while - as already mentioned – the new entrants are 
considerably poorer. An Eurostat study published in 2000 found that the GDP per 
capita ranges between 87 %(for Malta) to 27% (for Latvia) of the EU average; within 
the ten Central and Eastern European countries (Bulgaria and Romania included) 
the average GDP per capita was 2,6 times lower than in the Union.
The reason why this difference matters is not only a matter of envy. To a poor 
country membership in a rich men’s club, burdened with the rules and expenses 
which by its modest resources can ill afford, may in the end become a veritable 
nightmare. A possible consequence of such a bad outcome would, obviously, be 
mounting political tensions. Whether, when and how this income-gap can be clo-
sed has, therefore, become a matter of serious concern. An estimate made by the 
European Commission in 2001, based on the actual per capita GDP levels and 
current growth rates, found that relatively rich Slovenia would need only ten, but 
poor Romania a full 600 years to catch up to the EU average (Rachman 2001, 14). 
A more recent estimate, made by the Economist Intelligence Unit in 2003, yields 
a different picture: Here Cyprus would need 21, Malta 29, but Slovenia 31 - while 
Bulgaria may need 63 and Romania full 80 years to catch up (Cottrell 2003, 4)
The acceptance of Central and Eastern European countries into EU member-
ship  indicates that they have been recognised as full-fl edged market economies. 
A proof of this may be the fact that fi ve out of eight post-communist candidate 
countries have today a bigger GDP  per capita than in 1989 – and therefore mastered 
the “transition crisis”. GDP growth rates which exceed those of the old EU mem-
bers may also give these countries some comfort; however, this difference is to a 
greater extent due to the slow growth in the Eurozone countries, notably France and 
Germany (The Financial Times, February 9/10th 2003, 13, Charlemagne – f 2003, 
33) than to a miraculous buoyancy in the candidate countries. Besides, knowing 
the rules of the game and acting accordingly is by far not enough. Appraisals of 
post-communist countries in the early nineties described them as poorly organi-
sed, low-tech and low-wage economies(cf. Siebert  1991 and attached bibliogra-
phy).That, it seems, has not considerably changed since then. In some countries, 
such as Estonia,  Latvia, Lithuania and Poland agriculture is still a big headache: 
while in the EU the agricultural sector employs on average 5% of its population, 
in the mentioned countries this is at least twice as much, with holdings mostly split 
into small subsistence farms. Their infrastructure is still the one inherited from 
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communist times: roads are in bad shape, railways are under-equipped, water and 
waste systems all have to be brought up to EU standards. Merely bringing Central 
European sewerage networks up to EU standards will cost about 40 billion euro. 
Most newcomers have therefore had to negotiate a delay of fi ve to  ten years before 
they become legally obliged to fi nish the job.”For the next 20 or 30 years, central 
Europe will be a building site” (Cottrell 2003, 6). All this requires a lot of money, 
which these countries simply do not have.
Moreover, most of the former cost-advantages from communist times are 
disappearing. An Estonian worker’s wage, which in the early was DM 100 worth, 
increased to more than DM 600 in 1997; by now it may already amount to two-
thirds of the EU average. Foreign investors point out at increases of other costs: 
energy is  to be had at world prices, while other services such as telecommunications 
are more expensive than in the West. The consequence: some industries, such as 
textiles and apparel, where labour cost are of crucial importance – have already 
in the late nineties started to move from Central Europe to cheaper countries such 
as Ukraine or Romania. Workers from these countries, for their part, are in turn 
migrating towards Central Europe (Lucas 1997,6-7).
Hence the closing of the productivity-gap and modernising their production 
becomes a priority for all Central European countries. True, in the period from 
1993 to 1997 the main Central European countries experienced, according to the 
EBRD, an authentic surge in productivity, ranging from 30% in the Czech Republic 
to 50% in Poland. But after this initial hike, achieved often by shedding excess 
workers, the post-communist managers found it much trickier to move upmarket 
and to modernise than imagined. Some are of external nature: communist planners 
preferred rail to road transport, complicating door-to-door deliveries for many 
enterprises. However, most problems are of an internal nature. Examples abound: 
companies spent millions of dollars on complex computer systems, only to use 
them  for printouts of invoices and keeping address lists. Other companies try to 
save money by doing everything by themselves, even writing their own computer 
software; outsourcing, which produced big cost-savings in Western companies, is 
only slowly gaining ground. Cost-cutting and focusing on the main priorities is also 
an art to be learned, while some management techniques as just-in-time deliveries 
cannot be applied. Management tends to be over-centralised, wasting the time of top 
managers for trivial tasks. Last but not least, most post-communist managers lack 
proper Western-style training, focused on continuous improvement of production 
of goods and services in both quantity and quality. (ibid., 15-16)
Many among these problems have to be resolved by the businessmen and admi-
nistrators in the newcomer countries. “That means learning the wiles of Brussels, 
using EU money prodently, getting public spending under control, keeping business 
happy and keeping the public informed” advises The Economist (Cottrell 2003, 
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4). Many hopes are pinned upon foreign investment, which is expected not only to 
alleviate shortages of capital, but also to modernise production as well as to improve 
the organisation and management of entreprises. Nevertheless,  some key problems 
need substantial help from “the wiles of Brussels” – notably the restructuring of 
agriculture and the improvement of infrastructure. On this the newcomer countries 
look forward to two well-established EU institutions: the common agricultural 
policy and the solidarity funds for regional development. On these exspectations, 
however, some serious doubts are arising.
The Uncertain Future of the Common Agricultural Policy
The Common Agricultural Policy has, from the beginning, occupied a central 
role in Union policy. The Union’s founders saw its advantages in that it would enable 
them to deal with agricultural problems common to all countries by collective action; 
to foster market stability through collective intervention in agricultural markets and 
through a common policy of external protection; that it would provide farmers with 
new outlets for their produce and that it would encourage regional specialisation in 
food products and thus offer consumers a wider choice. It was formally established 
in the Treaty of Rome, with the following fi ve formal objectives:
• To increase agricultural productivity by promoting technological progress 
and by ensuring the rational development of agricultural production and 
the optimal utilisation of other factors of production, in particular labour;
• To ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, in par-
ticular to increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in agricul-
ture;
• To stabilise agricultural markets
• To ensure the availability of food supplies, and
• To ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices.
Although even before the introduction of the common agricultural policy 
all member countries of the original six members had some such policies of their 
own, in the 1950s they produced only 85% of their food requirements. Hence this 
policy was primarily intended to attain the Community’s self-suffi ciency reduce 
risks and incease the effi ciency of agricultural producers. To this end the Union 
devoted a major part of its budget. In 2000 40,994 million euros were earmerked 
for purposes of the common  agricultural policy, plus additional 82 million euros 
for “other agricultural operations” (Jones 2001,187). This item represents, with 
more than 46% of the total EU budget, its most important part 
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The most important instrument of this policy are price supports, in the fra-
mework of which target prices for a number of agricultural commodities are set. 
If the price attainable on the market for a certain good falls below its target price, 
the produce may be sold to intervention agencies which operate in all member 
countries.  Producers of some products receive direct subsidies, as fl at rate aids by 
the hectare or quantity produced. A counterpart of  these are import barriers in the 
form of levies on agricultural imports as well as non-tariff  barriers in the form of 
import quotas. On the other hand, export subsidies are paid on some agricultural 
products exported from the EU, in order to eliminate the difference between EU and 
world prices. These subsidies (or restitutions) try to reduce the existing surpluses 
of agricultural pro-ducts (ibid. 214-215).
The result of all these policy measures is that they have more than fulfi lled 
some of their original objectives, in particular the attainment of high agricultural 
productivity and regularity of food supplies. The growth of productivity in EU 
agriculture has been dramatic – between 1973 and its 1989 agricultural output 
has risen by 29%. Because of this, the Union is now self-suffi cient in a number 
of basic agricultural products, such as cereals, wheat, butter, beef, veal, pork and 
sugar. It has become the world’s second largest exporter of agricultural produce. 
In the same time, the number of people employed in agriculture declined from 
13,4 million in 1973 to 6,9 million in 1999 – making only about 5% of the total 
working population. (Jones 2001, 217-218). All this has, however, been achieved 
at great cost. The Union found itself with huge and mounting surpluses of certain 
products such as cereals, meat, wine and  milk products, which it could only sell 
on export markets thanks to generous export subsidies - or distribute them as aid 
to the “needy” (Jones 2001, 214-215, 217-218).
In order to reduce the surpluses, a reform of 1992 was intended to shift policy 
from production incentives to other forms of assistance. The idea was to reduce 
price supports and increase income supports, including measures such as “set aside” 
policies – i.e. to disburse payments to farmers which renounced to cultivate a part 
of their land.. An early retirement scheme for farmers over 55 was proposed, with 
greater subsidies in less-favoured regions and mountain areas. An environmental 
action programme was also envisaged in order to “develop the potential of the co-
untryside”. This reform was intended to reduce, or at least contain the expenses of 
agricultural policy and shift the burden (in the form of high prices) from consumers 
to taxpayers (in the form of income supports).Although this reform signifi cantly 
reduced  subsidies for a number of major products, the outlay for purposes of the 
common agricultural policy has risen from 26,5 billion euro in 1990 to almost 50 
billion in 2002 (ibid 218, The Economist, June 28th, 2003, 16, 31). Amounts of 
such magnitude started to weigh heavily on the Unions’ fi nances, taking, as already 
mentioned, almost a half of the total bud-get. Besides, complaints were put forward 
that it disproportionally benefi ts some countries, such as France, the Netherlands, 
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Denmark and Ireland. Now with the accession of a number of  new countries of 
which Poland and some smaller counteirs have a big agricultural sector, the problem 
what to do has become all the more pressing.
Probably in order to prepare for enlargement, a new attempt to reform Euro-
pe’s farm policy was made in June, 2003, along the lines of the 1992 reform. The 
proposals were not aiming at cutting the expenses for farm support, but to “deco-
uple” subsidies from production. As expected, the proposals were resisted by the 
biggest recipients – France, Spain, Ireland and Portugal – which managed to water 
down the whole arrangement. So decoupling may  begin in 2005 but countries can 
choose to delay its introduction until 2007. No reduction in subsidies for cereals 
– the largest benefi ciary of support – were agreed, only support for dairy products 
was reduced. “More fudge than breakthrough” – commented The Economist (June 
28th, 2003, 31).
An assessment of the economic impact of enlargement on the agricultural 
sector prepared by the European Commission puts forward the following points:
• The effects of enlargement in agriculture will have little impact on overall 
EU-15 growth, since agriculture accounts for a small share in their GDP 
and employment.
• Productivity in the new entrants’ agri-food sector is exspected to improve 
over the next decade and in combination with the removal of trade barriers 
to increase competition for EU farms.
• So far the removal of trade barriers has led to a dramatic increase in net 
agri-food exports to the Central and East European countries. Given the 
importance of hygiene and quality requirements for this kind of products 
this development may continue, although accession should reduce diffe-
rences.
• A large number of workers is exspected to leave agriculture in the next 
decade in the countries joining the EU. Those who are likely to become 
unemployed as a consequence of agricultural restructuring or those who 
remain ineffi ciently employed, are older and low-skilled workers, which 
typically face constraints as well as lower incentives for migration. (En-
largement – b 2001,53-61, Enlargement – c 2001,42-51)
In order to alleviate the pains of accession, the Union has only in 2000 dis-
bursed 520 million euros in assistance to agriculture in the candidate countries 
(Enlargement – a, 2001, 45). But putting the above assessments into reverse, it 
becomes evident why the newcomer countries are badly in need of long-term ge-
nerous assistance for agricultural restructuring.
• For all newcomer countries with an agricultural sector of about 10% and 
more of GDP the impact of accession may be unfavourable. Price supports 
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of their own making as a response from domestic pressures wage increases 
as well as the recent appreciation of their currencies have reduced their 
already low competitiveness. Exports of agri-food products from the EU 
to the new entrants is already twice as big as their exports of these goods 
to the EU.
• Agricultural productivity in the new members is “considerably lower than in 
the EU – 15” and cannot be compensated by low wages anymore. Although 
it is exspected to rise because of the necessary economic reforms and the 
improved access to capital and technology, two large countries – Poland and 
Romania – have very unfavourable production structures. “About 80% of 
Polish land and most Romanian is used by very small-scale family farms.” 
These are hardly conducive to rapid productivity gains hence the process 
of restructuring may last for quite some time, causing quite serious social 
problems.
• In order to achieve adequate quality standards required by the EU, the new 
countries will have to invest considerable sums in modernisation which 
they can ill afford. For adequate funding EU aid may be indispensable.
• The already mentioned “large number of workers is exspected to leave 
agriculture in the next decade in the countries joining the EU” , as well as 
those which will remain unemployed or ineffi ciently employed – mostly 
older and low-skilled workers are the main victims of the process of agri-
cultural restructuring. Resulting social problems will cause further strains 
in the newcomer countries4
No wonder that these countries avidly exspect assistance in this process. It 
seems, however, that the EU, unable to curtail disbursements to the present bene-
fi ciaries of the common agricultural policy, is trying to squeeze some savings out 
from the newcomers. A proposal foresaw no extension of full subsidies to newcomer 
countries until 2006, until when they may receive only 25% of their due. The Polish 
government reacted strongly with a request for substantial increases of agricultural 
aid. Recent promises of lowering direct subsidies to 5% of the total value of the 
EU agricultural production advanced during the preparatory negotiations for the 
Doha round were also met with suspicions by new entrants. (Poslovni svijet, August 
20th, 2003, 26) They argue that they do not want to become second-class members. 
Consequently a heated debate over agricultural policy in the EU will continue with 
a rather uncertain outcome.
4 Data mentioned in the foregoing text are derived from Enlargement b and  c,  2001, 53-61 
and 42-51.
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The problems with the Regional and Cohesion Funds
The next instrument of communitarian policy that the new member countries 
pin their hopes upon are the regional and cohesion funds, earmarked to stimulate 
development in less developed regions as well as in backward member countri-
es. The common regional policy started with the establishment of the European 
Regional Development Fund in 1975 after the entry of Britain and Ireland – two 
countries with large regional disparities. This policy was warmly welcomed by 
Italy because of its poor Mezzogiorno region. The number of countries aiming to 
benefi t from this policy increased sharply after the accession of Greece, Portugal 
and Spain when the number of people living in poor regions with per capita incomes 
of less than 75% of the Union average doubled.
This policy made further progress with the course of times. According to an 
Eurostat report published in 2001 and based on 1998 data there were 46 needy re-
gions accounting for 20% of the Union’s population. These comprised eleven out 
of thirteen regions in Greece, fi ve out of seven in Portugal, eight in Spain, four in 
France, fi ve in Italy, four (overseas regions) in France, one in Austria and one in 
Ireland (Jones 2001, 324-235). In addition to the European Regional Development 
Fund and the European Social Fund which is also part of regional policy, a special 
Cohesion Fund was established at the Maastricht summit in 1991 after strong 
pressures from the four poorest states keen to fulfi l the convergence criteria for the 
entry into the economic and monetary union. The fund applies to countries with 
a GNP per capita of less than 90% of the Union average. These comprise the four 
poorest countries – Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain – with a total population of 
63 million. The difference between the Regional and Cohesion fund is that the Fund 
outlays are program based, while the Cohesion Fund can be used only to fi nance 
transport and environment infrastructure projects. The outlay for structural opera-
tions, i.e. the Regional and Cohesion Fund with some minor purposes amounted 
in 2000 to 31,802 million euro and was with 36% the second biggest item of the 
Union’s budget For the period from 2000 to 2006,  213 billion euros are earmarked 
for the Union’s structural funds (ibid. 187, 238-239, Charlemagne – g 2003,34)
After a number of reforms, the main objectives of the EU regional policies 
are:
• Aid to lagging regions: it is directed to regions with a per capita GDP of 
less than 75% of the EU average and to regions with very low population 
density. There is additional support for regions with exceptionally high 
unemployment. To this end about two-thirds of structural funds is availa-
ble.
• Aid to regions undergoing economic and social conversion: it provides 
assistance to regions with major economic and social restructuring needs. 
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This includes areas undergoing economic and social change in the indu-
strial and service sectors, declining rural areas, urban areas in diffi culties 
and depressed areas dependent on fi sheries. To this end about a tenth of the 
total structural outlays is reserved.
• Aid for the development of human resources: it supports the adaptation and 
modernisation of education, training and employment outside the lagging 
regions. Projects under this objective must promote equal opportunities 
between men and women. They are not regionally based and comprise all 
human resource operations in the EU. Outlays for this purpose amount to 
about an eighth of the total structural outlays. (Jones 2003, 246).
Everything mentioned above shows that these policies correspond exactly to 
the most urgent needs of the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe. 
Hence an eagerness to become benefi ciaries of these policies. They feel entitled 
to them all the more, since fi fty-one out of fi fty-three regions of the new member 
states qualify for regional aid. Moreover, the new entrants are obliged to bring their 
infrastructure and environmental protection to EU standards in a period from fi ve 
to ten years.  This implies an extremely heavy fi nancial burden measured in tens 
and hundreds of billions of euros. This, of course, raises a real panic among the 
present benefi ciaries of regional policies. The greatest worries are expressed by 
the four most privileged among them – Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain – who 
may become ineligible for aid from the Cohesion Fund since they are not any 
more the poorest members in the club. For obvious reasons they will nevertheless 
try to secure their share of benefi ts for the future. On the other hand,  some other 
benefi ciaries may also be affected by the new situation: since the EU average will 
be signifi cantly reduced by the entry of the poorer countries, many regions which 
have hitherto been eligible for regional aid may be not so any more – as some of 
the German, French and British regions.
The conventional opinion has always hailed these policies as a proof of Eu-
ropean solidarity through which the richer parts of the Union are helping the less 
well-off. The EU authorities are also quick to point out that the effectiveness of 
these policies has been shown by the economic growth they have initiated in Greece, 
Ireland Portugal and Spain. According to the European Commission, the average 
GDP per person of Europe’s poorest regions rose frome 54,2% of the EU average 
in 1987 to 61,1% ten years later. The catch-up for poorer countries like Spain and 
Ireland was even faster; indeed, the average Irish income per head is now quite a lot 
higher than the EU average. No wonder that “the promise of gleaming new EU-fi -
nanced motorways and fi ne civic buildings has been among the biggest inducements 
dangled before the ten countries due to join the club next year” (Charlemagne – g 
2003, 34). In recent times, however, some academics have started to question their 
usefulness. Thus a Portuguese economist at the Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Pedro 
Pita-Barros, put forward at a conference the following arguments:
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• Regional aid may distort priorities, because businesses are established to 
exploit the availability of subsidies – most obviously for construction and 
training – rather than responding to the real demands of the market.
• In order to qualify for regional aid the recipient countries usually have to 
contribute about a half of an EU-fi nanced project. That tempts them to 
spend taxpayers’ money on projects that otherwise they would not start at 
all.
• The result is a number of infrastructural projects of marginal value, under-
taken only in order “not to lose European money” even – as in Portugal 
– budgetary  austerity makes such outlays quite unwelcome.
Similar complaints were recently voiced by a Greek offi cial, who stated that 
such projects distorted the whole business climate: “Anybody who works hard at 
a regular business is considered as an idiot, since it’s much easier to set up a pro-
ject to draw on European subsidies.” Finally, a recent article in Economic Policy5 
by Karen Midlefart-Knaevik of the Norvegian School of Economics and Henry 
Overman  of the London School of Economics suggests that “EU aid programmes 
attrace R&D-intensive industries to regions receiving relatively high amounts of 
aid but which are not abundantly endowed with skilled labour.” The result is a 
distortion of economic development, as poor regions are encouraged to go high-
tech, when they might be better off concentrating on more basic industries.So far 
so good. Maybe the critics are right; but all these arguments will not only by the 
present benefi ciaries, but especially by the new member countries be seen as an 
excuse to curtail or even end these policies on which they depend so much. The 
argument is familiar and rather obvious: the donor countries are loth to increase 
their contributions, the benefi ciaries fret for their benefi ts while the prospective 
candidates vie for their share in the cake. This will be the background of increased 
future confl icts and tensions on this issue.
The perils of joining the monetary union
The replacement of the currencies of all member states with a single currency 
is the ultimate goal of the Economic and Monetary Union. “It is undoubtedly the 
most ambitious, far-reaching and controversial integration project ever undertaken 
by the Union. It is also perhaps the riskiest” (Jones 2001, 287) At fi rst sight, it seems 
that everything has turned out well. At the beginning of 1999, eleven member states 
5 K.Midelfart-Knarvik and H.Overman (2002): “Delocation and European Integration – is 
Structural Spending Justifi ed?” Economic Policy, October. 34.  Quoted, as well as the foregoing 
arguments. according to Charlemagne – g 2003,
U. DUJŠIN: EU Enlargement From Fifteen To Twenty-five: Problems and Prospects
EKONOMSKI PREGLED, 55 (3-4) 227-255 (2004) 249
effectively replaced their national currencies as units of account with the euro as a 
single European currency. In January 2001 Greece joined as the twelfth member. 
On January 1st, 2002 euro notes and coins have substituted national currencies, and 
at the end of February  2002 the national notes and coins have ceased to be legal 
tender. The transition to the euro has been unexpectedly  smooth. The European 
Central Bank is effectively functioning as a monetary authority, acting vigorously 
in order to maintain price stability. In the fi rst four years, from January 1999 to 
January 2003, the exchange rate of the euro to the dollar has fallen by about a third, 
but has since, to the delight of American exporters, risen to a level about a fi fth 
higher than the dollar. So where are the problems?
Since the euro is the fi rst currency whose value is not guaranteed by a single 
sovereign state, special rules of conduct for the member countries had to be  devised. 
At its session in Amsterdam in June 1997, the Council of Ministers established the 
set of rules in the form of the so-called Stability and Growth Pact, whose basis are 
the following “convergence criteria”:
• Low infl ation – an average of not more than 1,5% higher than that of the 
three best performing states in the year prior to examination; later on, as a 
matter of current policy an infl ation target of up to 2% annually has been 
established.
• Low long-term interest rates – no more higher than 2% than the three best-
performing states in the year prior to examination.
• An annual budget defi cit of no more than 3% of GDP
• A public debt ratio no more than 60% of GDP – and, for candidate coun-
tries
• Two years’ currency stability within the Exchange Rate Mechanism mea-
ning that a member’s currency would have to be in the normal fl uctuation 
margin of the ERM, with no constraints on international capital fl ows and 
no devaluation on its own initiative against the currency of any member 
state (Jones 2001, 298).
For the new members, joining the European Monetary Union is another da-
unting challenge. Many are eager to join, so as to enjoy the following exspected 
benefi ts of a single currency:
• The elimination of the currency risk, especially for smaller countries because 
of their “funny money” (R.Dornbusch)
• Lower interest rates, since there is no currency risk and the country risk 
becomes transparent, as well as
• Faster economic growth thanks to an easier access to hitherto scarse capi-
ral.
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On some entry criteria, the newcomers are in good shape. Infl ation is lower 
in most of them than in Greece, Italy or Spain a few years before they adopted the 
euro. Against that, many have bigger budget defi cits – over 5% in Poland, even 
more in Hungary. Pressing too fast towards  a lower one might reduce the growth of 
their GDP’s which is still below EU levels. Moreover, the obligation to stay for two 
years in the ERM 2 regime, which implies the dismantling of all remaining capital 
controls may expose the candidates to greater risks of instability because of possible 
erratic capital movements. True, the applicants may call on interventions from the 
European Central Bank to fend off speculative attacks and stabilise their exchange 
rates. But how effective this intervention may be remains to be seen. Therefore some 
economists advocate an independent adoption of the euro (“euroisation”) – which, 
in turn,  both the Commission and the Europesn Central Bank disapprove of.(The 
Economist, April 5th, 2003, 71). Anyway, the new member states aren’t pressed to 
join the monetary union quickly or after a determined period.
On the other hand, it seems that recently the goal of accession to the mone-
tary union has suffered a loss in glamour and popularity. In 2003 two countries , 
Denmark and Sweden, held referendums on adopting the euro, and both rejected 
it; Britain even didn’t call upon an already announced one. Although some seemin-
gly irrational reasons, such as an infringement of national sovereignty, may have 
been decisive – there are also some practical reasons.In fact, this arrangement has 
generated two rather inconvenient problems. The fi rst is that the European Cen-
tral Bank, in its function of monetary authority, has to determine uniform interest 
rates, although the business conditions in various member countries vary widely. 
Thus these interest rates are too low for countries with a buoyant economy (e.g. 
Ireland) but too high for countries with lagging growth rates (as recently France, 
Germany and Portugal). Consequently, a country hit by an economic slowdown 
has some kind of fi scal stimulus as the only instrument as its disposal. Hence the 
second problem: the Stability and Growth Pact gi-ves to such a country a very 
limited room for manouuvre, forcing it into a situation to breach its rules.  This 
has recently happened fi rst to Portugal, and then to two biggest eurozone countries 
– France and Germany - which plunged into a recession in 2001 and by the end 
of 2003 will have exceeded the permitted budget defi cit for the third consecutive 
year. What in this context is really worying is that the subsequent course of events 
has taken a rather dangerous turn.
On November 25th, 2003 the EU fi nance ministers had to decide on sanctions 
against France and Germany for the breach of rules of the Stability Pact (which, 
nota bene, are included into the draft of the Constitution). The Commission of 
Ministers had recommended that the rules be applied to the miscreants – all the 
more so as both of them refused to make the further cuts in expenditures that the 
Commission demanded. Instead, the majority of fi nance ministers refused to do 
so. “Dead, sleeping or in the refrigerator?” commented The Economist the fate 
U. DUJŠIN: EU Enlargement From Fifteen To Twenty-five: Problems and Prospects
EKONOMSKI PREGLED, 55 (3-4) 227-255 (2004) 251
of the Pact after this decision; now whatever happens, it seems that the sanctions 
mechanism “has now become unenforceable.” (The Economist, November 28th, 
2003, 29). This may have far-reaching consequences. First of all, the Union is a 
“community of laws”: now if law is replaced by political bargaining, with bigger 
countries being able to squeeze out bigger benefi ts, then the very basis of the Union 
is undermined. Besides, the credibility of the euro as a currency depends on the 
enforcement of the Pact. On the other hand, Portugal’s compliance to the rules 
have pushed the country into deep recession, and for this reason its budget defi cit 
is again out of control.
Many economists, as well as the Commission’s president, Romano Prodi, 
have criticised the provisions of the Pact as “stupid”. So it may be hoped that the 
provisions of the Pact may evolve into a more fl exible arrangement, or that it may 
become some sort of “gentlemen’ s agreement”. But the diffi culty with this latter 
idea is that the Pact would then become an arrangement in which some  gentlemen 
are more equal than others. (ibid, 30)
Another reason for this kind of “euro-scepticism” may be the disappointing 
results of economic growth in the euro zone countries.  On the occasion of the ado-
ption of the “Lisbon agenda” in 2000, the assembled leaders promised to turn the 
EU “into the world’s most competitive economy by  2010.” Every year since then 
EU leaders meet in March to review progress on that matter – and their fi ndings 
are less than encouraging. “Despite of the burst of the dotcom bubble, September 
11th and a rash of American corporate scandals, the EU is still growing markedly 
more slowly than America – and most forecastsers predict that this will remain so 
at least for a couple of years”  commented The Economist (Charlemagne – h 2003, 
33)  Among the reasons for this, the way the monetary union has been conceived 
and operated may have its fair share in it. Contrary to the countries of continental 
Europe, which have become “euro-enthusiastic” on political grounds, the British 
have based their considerations about the euro on purely economic ones. Thus in 
the middle of a heated debate on the topic, the British fi nance minister, Gordon 
Brown, published the results of an extensive study  on the potential benefi ts of 
adopting the euro based on the following fi ve “trests”:
• Convergence: are business cycles and economic structures suffi ciently 
in step so that the country may live comfortably with euro-wide interest 
rates?
• Is the economy suffi ciently fl exible to deal with “assymmetric shocks” 
– changes in the economic environment that affect some countries more 
than others?
• Will the euro encourage companies, especially foreigh ones, to invest since 
the exchange-rate risk has been eliminated?
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• What is the impact of the euro on the fi nancial service industry, and
• Will the euro boost growth and jobs?(The Economist, May 3rd,2003, 33)
The results were decisively negative, so that the idea of calling a referendum 
was abandoned. Half-jokingly The Economist published an article which argued, 
rather convincingly, that Germany, the most important member of the euro zone, 
would be better off if it left it. In sum, with a risky accession, its basic rules infrin-
ged and with the initial high hopes dashed, the euro and the European Monetary 
Union  look at the moment as facing a rather awkward situation.
Conclusions
Now, after all that what has been said, what can we conclude - if anything? Will 
the Union be able to “digest” this newest and trickiest enlargement? Maybe it may. 
“Guided by treaties that scarcely anybody can understand, towards a destination 
on which nobody can agree, the European Union has survived, and often thrived, 
for almost half a century” First, it has secured a lasting peace in Western Europe 
after World War II, offering to its devastated countries the vision of a supranational 
order intrinsically more peaceful than the nationalism which had caused the war. 
Second, it has taken a leading role in the restoration and rebuilding of eastern Euro-
pe, offering a vision of freedom and prosperity, for which these countries hungered 
after decades of communist rule; this enlargement is “the happy outcome of this 
offer” (Cottrell 2003, 19). So far so good. But the result is a vastly heterogeneous 
community of nation states, which – as the constitutional debate has demonstrated 
– are all too conscious of their national interests.
Analysing the problem of “constitutional choice” in the European union, Pro-
fessor Branko Smerdel warned that this choice is “…a process, not a moment: The 
constitutional document has, through the decision about the choice of principles 
and basic institutional complexes opened the possibilities to develop this process 
through operational decisions” (Smerdel 2003, 516). But while the founding fat-
hers of the American constitution might be justifi ed in their ambition to show that 
political institutions can be, as Thomas Jefferson famously put it, established by 
“refl ection and choice” instead of “accident and force” (ibid., 512); the present 
battle for the European constitution is an evident example of the latter. This is all 
the more worrying, since the direction towards which the Union is heading is far 
from clear.
Whether the present draft of the Constitution will approach “Europe” to its 
citizens or promote democracy, remains to be seen. It certainly has not contributed 
to a more effi cient decisionmaking, since it only reopened all the questions which 
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have already been more or less solved in Amsterdam and Nice. Minimalist Britons 
may be satisfi ed with this outcome; but will it be enough for the proper functi-
oning of the Union? The preceding review was restricted only to the sore points 
of economic policy. Even these offer lots of motives for discord, acrimony and 
confl ict. The question arises, whether this last enlargement has not overburdened 
the Union as a community of common interest; even powerful empires have been 
ruined when overstretched.
This question is all the more justifi ed, since the process of  the Union’s “de-
epening” also comprises a common foreign and security policy, as essential attri-
butes of statehood. To this end, the establishment of the Union as a legal person 
and the election of a more permanent president and a foreign minister are by far 
not enough. There is no doubt that the eurocrats in Brussels have in the last four-
and-a-half decades steered the Union through many rough waters and developed 
enviable skills to tame recalcitrant (smaller) member states. In the future these 
skills will be in urgent demand.ut beware: it is much easier to forge compromises 
on fi shing quotas and Europe-wide quality standards for condoms than to decide 
on issues of such scope and importance such as foreign and security policy matters. 
So, for example, what has to be the position of Europe in a world increasingly 
divided into big economic blocks? How to defi ne Europe’s relations with America 
- has it to be contained in its imperial excesses (as the French and Germans want) 
or to try to offer it guidance (a British ambition)? Is Russia still a potential threat 
(as feared by many people in Central and Eastern Europe), a potential partner (as 
considered by the French) or a desirable Union member (as perceived by Italy’s 
Silvio Berlusconi)? What should the relations to the Muslim world be, having in 
mind the Middle East conundrum as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey 
as aspiring candidates? What to do in the United Nations? The Iraqui crisis has 
shown the  extent of discord on the very basics of this issue are controversial and 
how small is the probability that e.g. France and Britain, as permanent members of 
the UN Security Council may “unequi-vocally follow the established guidelines of 
the common foreign policy” as the draft of the Unions’ constitution requires.
Finally, if Europe wants to become not only big but also great, it must fi nd a 
common sense of “Europeanness”, i.e. a sense of common purpose and a common 
historical mission. With this, the future of Europe’s union of nations stands and falls 
– but this is not all. The American conglomerate of nationalities is held together by 
the faith into the “American dream”, i.e. the belief that in America everybody can 
make it to the top through his own efforts and ingenuity. The quest for a similar 
“European dream”, to act as a glue for the European conglomerate of nations, may 
be the next great task the EU may concentrate upon.
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POVEĆANJE EUROPSKE UNIJE OD PETNAEST NA DVADESET PET: 
PROBLEMI I  MOGUĆNOSTI
Sažetak
Pristupanje deset zemalja kandidata Europskoj uniji u svibnju 2004. godine obilježava 
važnu prekretnicu u povijesti. Kako bi se osigurao nesmetani tijek ovog procesa potreban 
je jasan uvid u probleme koje on uključuje. Oni se mogu svrstati u dvije glavne grupe. Prvi 
je problem «produbljivanja» procesa integracije u Uniji, koji u prvom redu znači vitalan 
proces odlučivanja i  svrsishodnu primjenu pojedinih politika. Drugi se odnosi na izazove 
s kojima se ekonomska i monetarna politika suočavaju zbog nove konstelacije interesa 
izazvane pristupanjem novopridošlih zemalja. Zaključci slijede.  
Ključne riječi: proces pristupanja, odlučivanje, ekonomska integracija, politike Eu-
ropske unije 
